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Update Criminal Law & Procedure
DAVID E. VANDERCOY*
BRUCE G. BERNER**
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of the United States remained extremely active
accepting and deciding criminal issues with constitutional dimension and,
therefore, with implications for state criminal practice. The strong trend
of these decisions is to strengthen law enforcement; constitutional protections are· clearly contracting. Although the subject matter mix was
refreshingly eclectic, the Fourth Amendment, confessions, habeas corpus,
and the death penalty continued to occupy a large share of the Court's
time. Surprisingly, the Confrontation Clause, the subject of much recent
Court activity, was not addressed this past term. However, the Indiana
Supreme Court issued important decisions in the confrontation area as
well as in many others. Several significant statutory developments in the
substantive crime area will also be discussed.

I.

SUBSTANTIVE

A. Burglary
Both the Indiana ·c ourts and legislature were active in the burglary
area. The cases continued to explore the question of when a building
is a udwelling,'' a circumstance that elevates burglary from a Class C
felony to a Class B. 1 In Ferrell v. Stat& the supreme court held that

• Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.
•• Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Valparaiso University School of Law.
1. The common-law fonnulation of burglary (and arson) embraced only dwellings.
To break and enter a building other than a dwelling was simply not burglary, though it
may have been some lesser offense. This was no mere quibble over semantics. The .particular
evil at which the crime of burglary was aimed was the intrusion into the sacred space
of the habitation. It was not a property crime; it was the threat to personal safety and
the sanctity of the habitation which was breached. "A person's home is his castle" fairly
depicts the idea. A person's store, warehouse, or office were his property, to be sure,
but not his castle. Slowly, especially in America, burglary was broadened to include all
sorts of buildings and structures, sometimes even automobiles. Whether tha:t development
was even coherent is a question of some complexity, but there is no doubting that it
happened and that Indiana has followed that development by broadening the subjects of
burglary to include buildings and structures of all sorts. Recognizing the greater dangers
and affront inherent in house intrusions, Indiana elevated a breaking and entry of a
dwelling to a Class B felony. See IND. ConE § 3S-43-2-1 (1988) (burglary); id. § 35-411-10 (definition of "dwelling,').
2. 565 N.E.2d 1070 (Ind. 1991).

..
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a building remained an occupant's3 ''dwelling" even though he had not
slept there for four months. 4 The victim did maintain an address and
phone at that location and visited the house on a regular basis. This
was sufficient contact to treat the building as his dwelling. In Brown
v. State, 5 the victims physically relocated to another house, but maintained
the right of occupancy and in fact, left personal items in the house.
Again, this was held sufficient contact so that the building was still
legally, if not factually, their ''dwelling.' ' 6
In Indiana Code 35-43-2-1.5 the legislature created a new crime,
Residential Entry: ''A person who knowingly or intentionally breaks and
enters the dwelling of another person commits residential entry, a Class
D felony.'' 7 This statute was prompted presumably by problems of proof
8
in certain housebreaking scenarios. The Indiana Burglary Statute requires
proof that the defendant entered with the intent to commit a felony.
Often the state will have proof that the defendant broke and entered
a house without consent, but the defendant takes the position either
that he intended no target crime at all or that the target crime is a
misdemeanor. 9 The new statute permits prosecution for a felony (Class

3. Burglary has always been understood as a crime against the occupant, not the
owner, because the theory of the harm was not property centered but privacy centered.
4. Ferrell, 565 N.E.2d at 1072.
S. 580 N ..E.2d 329 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
6. /d. at 330. The "dwelling" cases all seem bizarre unless one first firmly ftxes
on the precise harm that the common law understood burglary to perpetrate. Any ordinary
observer of the buildings in these cases would say, "This is a house. This is a dwelling."
The common law had, however, no special interest in protecting one type of architecture
(house) more than others (store, warehouse, etc.). They were all subject to propertycentered crimes such as trespass, theft, or vandalism. The crime of burglary protected
the special, human connection to the place one lived. Of course, threat to physical safety
in housebreakings was often entailed, but this too was not the heart of the problem.
Occupants out for the evening or on vacation were still understood to be subject to the
special harm of outsiders intruding into their space. Indeed, psychologists are familiar
with cases in which people can no longer Jive in their homes after they have been burglarized.
What the recent dwelling cases in Indiana are really exploring is: "When does this special
relationship with the habitational place start and when· does it end?u
7. IND. CoDE § 35-43-.2-1.5 (Supp. 1991).
8. IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1 (1988).
9. Part of the problem here is theft, the most common target crime in burglary.
Indiana Code § 35-43-4-2, the basic theft statute, has been interpreted to require an intent
to deprive the owner of the property substantially permanently. See, e.g., Nelson v. State,
337 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). Thus, if the defendant claims that he intended to
take the property temporarily (which, in some cases, is a plausible claim, especially with
motor vehicles), there is no theft, but only criminal conversion, IND. CODE § 3543-4-3
(1988), which is only a misdemeanor and thus, does not support burglary. If the prosecutor
cannot prove an intent to commit theft, the state is left with two misdemeanors-criminal
trespass, IND. CoDE § 35-43-2-2 (Supp. 1991), and criminal conversion.
.

.

.
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D) without any requirement of proof of intention to commit a target
crime,., Of course, if such intention is shown, the crime becomes a Class10
B burglary.

B. Criminal Gangs
11

The legislature also enacted Indiana Code 35-45-9, a series of
provisions on criminal gangs, and amended the RICO statute•z to incorporate gang activity. The subject of these provisions is a broad one.
Any adequate treatment of the legal and constitutional implications of
such changes is beyond the scope of this Article. Like RICO and
"organized crime" statutes, the new legislation is an attempt to add
enforcement weapons in fighting a problem which is proving intractable
to solution by more conventional penal statutes. Clearly, the question
of whether these provisions unduly offend First Amendment associational
rights will have to be addressed. 13

10. Note that the statute does not cover illegal breaking and entry of a building
other than a dwelling. In such cases, intent to commit a felony will still be necessary to
convict of Class C burglary. If such intent cannot be proved, the state will be left with
a misdemeanor prosecution for criminal trespass. Id.
11. Indiana Code § 35-45"'9 provides as follows:
Sec. 1. As used in this chapter, "criminal gang" means a group with at
least five (5) members that specifically:
(1) either:
(A) promotes, sponsors, or assists in; or
(B) participates in; and
(2) requires, as a c,ondition of membership or continued membership; the
commission of a felony or an act that would be a felony if committed by an
adult or the offense of battery.
Sec. 2. As used in this chapter, uthreatens'" includes a communication
made with the intent to hann a person or the person's property or any other
person or the property of another person.
Sec. 3. A person who knowingly or intentionally actively participates in a
criminal gang commits criminal gang activity, a Class D felony.
Sec. 4 .. A person who threatens another person because the other person:
(1) refuses to join a criminal gang; or
(2) has withdrawn from a criminal gang;
commits criminal gang intimidation, a Class C felony.
12. The criminal RICO statute is Indiana Code § 35-45-6-l, -2 (Supp. 1991). The
civil RICO statute is Indiana Code § 34·4-30.5-1 to -4.5 (Supp. 1991).
13. There would be clear constitutional problems in making mere membership in
a group a crime, especially if the group ·is multi-purposed, if some purposes were legal
and if liability did not require proof of actual involvement in the illegal purpose$. See,
e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). The criminal gangs statute seems to
be drafted to avoid this difficulty insofar as possible. The- question is whether, because
it is so tightly drawn, anyone can ever be successfully prosecuted under it. It would seem,
at least, to be difficult to obtain proof that a gang actually conditions membership on
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II. ARREsT, SEARCH, & SEIZURE
The most important Fourth Amendment decisions of the past term
dealt with the parameters of the ''seizure" of a person, a topic the
United States Supreme Court had not addressed directly for several years.
Both decisions clearly forward a law enforcement agenda.
In California v. Hodari D. 14 and Florida v. Bostick, 15 the Court
dramatically changed the understanding of the initial phase .o f the policesuspect confrontation. Prior to Hodari D., the principal question involving whether a suspect had been "seized'' was whether an objectively
16
reasonable person would "feel free to Ieave." This could be ·proved
either by proof that the police physically restrained the suspect or engaged
in shows of authority clearly signalling compulsion and not a voluntary
conversation. The focus was on police conduct. Hodari D., a seven to
two decision, adds a new aspect, because now the "seizure" question
depends, in part, .on the suspect's reaction to the police. The police,
concededly with neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion, engaged
in a chase of Hodari D,., and others. There is no question that the police
clearly signalled an intention to detain him without his voluntary consent.
As he ran, he tossed away an object which later proved to be crack
cocaine,. The admissibility of that evidence was a.rgued to be a ''fruit
of the poisonous tree'' seizure. The Court held that Hodari had not
yet been seized and redefined a seizure to mean (a) the application of
physical restraint (a touching) or (b) a show of authority or force to
which the suspect yields.l1 Thus, until the suspect is caught or submits
to the authority, no seizure has taken place. Thus, the abandonment
of the cocaine was not the product of a seizure as none had yet taken
place. The old definition of not feeling "free to leave" remains as a
necessary aspect of this second type of seizure; it is, however, not
sufficient. The dissent worried about the potential for abuse. Police may
now engage in a ''threatening, but sufficiently slow chase'' to prompt
various behaviors from suspects without needing any level of suspicion
18
to do so.
In Bostick, the suspect clearly submitted to the police; thus, the
Hodari D. issue was not presented. Attention focused on the anterior

•

active participation in felonies . Groups such as this ordinarily do not have written charters~
The purpose for the, statute is understandable. The question is whether it successfully
navigates between the Scylla of First Amendment difficulty and the Charibdis of requiring
more proof than can be obtained.
14. 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
15.. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
_
16., See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
17. Hodari, 111 S. Ct. at 1552.
18!0 ld. at 1559' (quoting 3 WAYNE
ed. 1987 & Supp. 1991)).

LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §

9.'2, at 61 (2d
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question: How much police behavior constitutes a sufficient show of
authority so that the suspect does not objectively believe he is free to
leave or ignore the police? Florida police were ''working the buses," a
procedure which entails boarding public buses during layovers and asking
everyone (or some subgroup of people in some cases) to answer questions,
present identification, and often, to consent to a search of their carryon or stored luggage. Two unifor1ned, badged, armed police approached
Bostick, positioned themselves in the aisle between Bostick and the door,
and after preliminary questioning, asked him to consent to a search of
his luggage. He did so and the search disclosed cocaine. Because he so
clearly submitted to the police, the Hodari D. question was not presented.
Rather, the court held that the police conduct was not a seizure because
a reasonable person would not feel compelled to submit to such a
request. 19 The Court noted that any failure to cooperate could not be
used as the basis for any probable cause or reasonable suspicion.20 The
dissent argued that the average traveler does not know this to be true
and that the conduct of the police in this case was rife with compulsion.21
The case is complicated by the fact that bus travelers are not ''free to
leave'' the bus in the same way that a suspect approached on the street
is free to leave.
T'he combination of Hodari D. and Bostick presents a Hobson's
choice to a suspect confronted by police who have no lawful right to
arrest or stop him. Bostick requires great fortitude to withstand marginally
coercive tactics, yet Hodari D. makes anything the suspect says or does
not the product of a seizure and thus, usable against him to support
further police inferences. The third choice is to submit ''voluntarily"
as did Bostick.
In Florida v. Jimeno, 22 the Court held that consent to search a car
includes consent to open any containers within the car in which the
19. Id. at 1557.
20. ld. at 1556·57.
21. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
majority argues that any pressure against leaving is not of police origin. If a suspect does
not mind missing his bus (a matter about which the police are presumably indifferent),
he is "free to leave!' The dissent points out that "working the buses, is a technique
designed to exploit the very fact that the suspect has his own reasons for not exiting the
situation. It seems that this debate is an illustration of the limitation of language. When
the Court first penned "free to leave,, it was dealing with situatiQns in which the suspect
was walking, driving, or otherwise going somewhere. To be free of the police contact
was to "leave." Had the first case arose in the suspect's home, "free to leave" \vould
hardly have been chosen .. When the issue arises in situations like Bostick, \Vhen what the
suspect wants is to *'stay" and have the police "leave," one needs to get behind the
words of a doctrine to its function. What if the police hounded a suspect sitting or lying
in a hospital emergency room and claimed that he wast after all, free to leave?
22. 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991).

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

1162

{Vol. 25:1157

sought item could be located. 23 Therefore,- the defendant could not
complain that following his consent to search his car for controlled
substances, the police opened a brown paper bag which contained cocaine.
The Court distinguished this situation from one in which the police,
having received consent to search a car's trunk, pried open a locked
24
briefcase in the trunk. There, the Court reasoned that a policeman
could not reasonably believe that the consenter meant to authorize such
conduct. 25
California v. Acevedo26 overrules Arkansas v. Sanders21 and United
States v. Chadwick, 28 wherein the so-called Chadwick-Sanders rule was
developed. Police in Acevedo had probable cause that a paper bag being
carried by a suspect contained controlled substances. The police waited
until the suspect reached his car and placed the bag in the car, then
detained the suspect, searched the bag, and found the evidence. Although
it has long been true that automobile searches upon probable cause can
be conducted without a warrant29 and that such a search could extend
to all containers within the vehicle, 30 the Chadwick-Sanders rule held
that when probable cause was directed not to the car generally but to
a particular container in a car, the police could not wait until that
container was deposited in the car and then employ the automobile
exception. 31 The Court rejected Chadwick-Sanders as anomalous. Thedissent noted that the potential for abuse was high because the police,
had they seized the bag before it was put in the car, would have needed
a warrant. 32
The case of County a/Riverside v. McLaughlin 33 further elaborates
34
on the requirement of Gerstein v. Pugh, which held that an arrestee
held without an arrest warrant is entitled to a prompt determination of
probable cause. 35 McLaughlin progresses toward defining ~'prompt.'' The
•.
23~

Id. at 1804.
24. Id.
25. I d. (citing State v. Wells, 110 -S. Ct. 554 (1990)).

26. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).

'

27. 442 u.s . 753 (1979)
28. 433 U ~S. 1 (1977).
29. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
30. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
31. The idea, of course, is that if the police could not search a container without
a warrant when it was outside the car, the police should not be permitted to wait until
it is placed in a car and then claim the exigency of the mobility of the vehicle to avoid
the warrant requirement.
32. California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1995 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. 111 S. Ct.. 1661 (1991).
34. 420 u.s. 103 (1975).
35. Id. at 118.
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Court held that this determination (which may be ex parte)36 must occur
''as soon as reasonably feasible, but in no event later than 48 hours
37
after arrest.'' The case resolved a division among the circuits~ some
of which had followed a forty-eight hour rule and some of which
(including the Seventh Court) had required a prompter finding. The
decision makes it absolutely clear that intervening weekends or holidays
are insufficient reasons for not complying with the forty-eight hour rule,
but other ''extraordinary circumstances'_'_might be.38
As a practical matter, it should be noted that while many states
~ombine the probable cause determination with other procedural events
(arraignment, presentment, or bail hearing), nothing requires them to
do so. Thus, in weekend or holiday situations when these other proceedings cannot occur within forty-eight hours, the Fourth Amendment
is satisfied with a post-arrest warrant issued by a neutral magistrate
following the same process as a pre-arrest warrant.
Indiana courts also devoted much of their time to Fourth Amendment
39
issues. In Smith v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court reviewed facts
generating issues calling for refinement of the doctrine of a 1990 case,
Maryland v. Buie~ 40 Buie permitted, incidental to arrest in a house, a
''protective sweep'' of the house to protect police from incipient danger
from accomplices, sympathizers, and others.41 The police in Smith made.
such a sweep and then entered a locked storeroom and found drying
marijuana. The Indiana Supreme Court held that because there was no
evidence that the room immediately adjoine,d the locus of arrest so that
an attack on officers could be launched therefrom, and because no
specific and articulable facts demonstrating any reasonable suspicion of
danger existed, this entry did not fall within the Buie exception.42 Once
the defendant is -arrested and the immediate danger past, the police may

36. Applications for arrest warrants made prior to physical arrest have always, of
course, been ex parte. Gerstein, as a Fourth Amendment case, never imposed anything
more than a requirement of a warrant in cases in which the physical arrest was made

without one as a condition precedent for holding the arrestee for any longer than was
necessary for administrative processing. The Gerstein requirement, thus, should not be
confused with other procedural requirements to prove probabl~ cause at other stages of
the formal judicial process. This confusion is prompted because many jurisdictions have
chosen to satisfy the Gerstein requirement by amalgamating it with some other step in
that process, such as presentment (preliminary arraignment).
37. McLaughlin, Ill S. Ct. at 1671.
38. ld..

39. 565 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. 1991).
40. 494
325 (1990).
4t. Id. at 3.36.
42. Smith, 565 N.E.2d at 1063.

u.s.
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search, under the search-incident-to-arrest exception, only within the
rules of Chime/ v. California. 44 Beyond the Chime/ scope, police may
only search further after obtaining a search warrant.
III.

CoNFESSIONS

The United States Supreme Court decided three cases involving
confessions, two on the Edwards rule and one on coerced confessions.
Minnick v. Mississippi4 5 elaborated further on the much litigated Edwards
rule. In Edwards v. Arizona,46 the Court held that when a suspect during
custodial interrogation invokes the right to consult with a lawyer, all
questioning must cease and may not be reinitiated by the police until
the suspect consults with an attorney. 47 The Minnick case addressed
whether the prohibition of initiating interrogation continues even after
a suspect has consulted with counsel. The Court held, 6-2, that it does.48
Edwards protection requires that a suspect not be interrogated without
counsel present. Thus, the intervening consultation does not toll the
Edwards prohibition. Of course, if the suspect initiates the dialogue, the
Edwards rule has been satisfied and the analysis follows traditional
Miranda Iines.49
In McNeil v. Wisconsin, 50 the defendant was arrested for robbery.
At arraignment, he requested a lawyer to represent him. Later, while
still in custody, he was interrogated on an unrelated murder. The defendant had not invoked Edwards, which would have prevented policeinitiated interrogation on any subject.51 However, he had requested Sixth

43. The police may have some basis for a warrantless search wholly apart from
the search-incident-to-arrest theory on which Buie is based. For example, an occupant
may consent to a search or the presence of others, who present no physical threat to the
officers but who may destroy evidence, might give police the right to make a warrantless
search provided they have probable cause of the presence of crime-connected items. See,
e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
44. 395 U.S. 752 (1969}. Chime/ permits a search of the arrestee's person and the
area within his immediate control.
45. 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990).
46. 451 u.s. 477 (1981).
47. The invocation of a lawyer in Edwards must be kept distinct from the procedure
which follows a suspect's invocation of silence. On invocation of silence, see Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
48. Minnier, 111 S. Ct. at 492.
49. Under the Rehnq uist Court, it is critically important to keep separate the Fifth
Amendment Miranda line from the Sixth Amendment line of cases springing from Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). This court has interpreted Miranda grudgingly,
but the Massiah line quite expansively.
50. Ill S. Ct. 2204 (1991).
51. See Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (f988).
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Amendment counsel at his arraignment which the Court, in Michigan
v. Jackson, 52 seemed to treat as tantamount to an Edwards invocation.
The McNeil Court held that Jackson did not control this case. 53 Whereas_
the Edwards invocation is not offense~sp_ecific, but terminates policeinitiated interrogation on any subject, the Jackson rule; founded on the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel (and not the Fifth Amendment counsel
right as Miranda-Edwards), is ''offense-specific" and thus does not bar
police-initiated interrogation on subjects not the subject of the current
prosecution._54 Defense counsel should note that McNeil can be obviated
easily (if counsel is present at the arraignment) by having the defendant
make a clear Edwards invocation on the record.
The Indiana Court of Appeals decided another Edwards issue in
5
Rider v. State. 5 A mother's statement to police, ''We need an attorney,''
was urged by her twenty-year-old son to constitute an Edwards invocation
for him as well, especially since her statement was made after consultation
with him. The court held that only the defendant could invoke his
Edwards right; therefore, his confession, given after full Miranda warnings and waiver, was admissible.56
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Arizona v. Fulminante51
is unremarkable, but the dictum is a striking reversal of precedent.-The
Court held that a confession was coerced and therefore, inadmissible.58
Then, however,_the Court overruled a long line of cases and held that
a coerced confession could be harmless error under the doctrine of
59
Chapman v. California. This leaves a denial of counsel and a biased
trial judge as the only two errors which cannot be harmless under
Chapman. The Court distinguished these cases from coerced confessions
b_y noting that they involve structural errors rather than ''' trial" errors.60
Finally, the Court held that there was not proof beyond a reasonable
doubt (the Chapman standard) that this particular error was harmless. 61

52. 47S U.S. 625 (1986).
53. McNeil, Ill S. Ct. at 2209.
54~ ld~ at 2204.
55. 570 N.E.2d 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
56. /d. at 1288.
57. Ill S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
58. Id. at 1252.
59.
386
u.s.
18
(1967)
•
•
60. Fulminante; 111 S. Ct. at 1251 ..
61. Id. at 1257. Given the devastating :effect of a confession, ordinarily it will not
be clear at all, much less clear beyond a reasonable- doubt, that the jury's hearing of an
inadmissible confession was harmless. The decision, important as it may be to harmlesserror scholars, will probably have little practical impact. One has to imagine a case where
the other evidence is so comp_elting (perhaps the defendant had the bad form to commit
the crime on videotape) that the confession is clearly surplusage.
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JURY SELECTION

The Court decided two cases further developing the rule in Batson
v. Kentucky. 62 In Powers v. Ohio,63 the Court addressed a question left
open last term in Holland v. Illinois. 64 • In Holland, the Court denied a
Sixth Amendment claim of a white defendant that blacks had been
peremptorily challenged by the prosecution in violation of Batson. In
Batson, Justice Powell strongly intimated that had the case been argued
as an equal protection case, the result would have been different. 65
Writing for a seven to two majority, Justice Kennedy made good on
that promise (threat?) in Powers. The opinion notes that the equal
protection interests of the jurors themselves (well beyond the idea in
Batson that the defendant's equal protection rights were- violated), are
of constitutional dimension and that a white defendant has sufficient
standing to raise those claims. 66· Thus, prosecutors must state race neutral
reasons for peremptory challenges of racial minority jurors regardless
67
of the race of the defendant.·
As a counterpoint to Powers, the holding in Hernandez v. New
York6 8 indicates that the Court may be in a receptive mood to accept
as "racially neutral'' prosecutors' justifications for a Batson strike. Here;
the prosecutor struck many Spanish speaking jurors (the defendant is
variously described as Latino and Hispanic). The prosecutor explained
that he was not confident that these potential jurors would accept as
final the official court interpreter for Spanish speaking witnesses. The
Court felt that this was sufficiently ·':'race neutral'' over a strong dissent
from three justices.69
V.

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

In Cage v. Louisiana the Court once again made clear that trial
courts that embellish the meaning of ''reasonable doubt'' do so at great
peril. In Cape, the trial court included within the standard ·' -'beyond a
reasonable doubt" instructions: "It must be such doubt as would give
rise to a grave uncertainty.... lt is an actual, substantial doubt"; it
70

u.s.

62. 476
79 (1986).
63. Ill S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
64. 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990).
65. Batson, 476 U.S~ at 100.
66. /d. at 91.
67. Powers, I 11 S. Ct. at 1374. The Powers decision was acknowledged by the
Indiana Supreme Court in Holifield v. State, 572 N .E.2d 490 (Ind. 1991 )-.
68. Ill S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
69. /d. at 1873.
70. Ill S. Ct. 328 (1990).
•
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amounts to a ''moral, not a mathematical, certainty.'' The conviction
was reversed per curiam.11

VI.

72

RAPE-SHIELD STATUTEs
13

In Michigan v. Lucas, the Court held that a Michigan trial court
properly precluded evidence of a past sexual relationship between the
defendant and the prosecutrix because the defendant had not complied
with the notice requirement of the Michigan statute74 (which is quite
similar to the Indiana statute75 and to Federal Rule of Evidence 412).

VII.

FAIR TRIAL

The decision in Mu,Min v. Virginia16 reinforces the basic Burger
Court direction in publicity cases staked out in Murphy v. Florida.''
Voir dire examination disclosed that eight of the twelve jurors had heard
of the case, which was highly publicized, but that they could be impartial.
The judge did not inquire of those who had been exposed to publicity
as to the content of what they had read or heard. The defendant claimed
that his Sixth Amendment fair trial rights dictated that the judge probe
content. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that this was within the
sound discretion of the trial court.78 The jurors must agree to judge the
case on the evidence, and the judge must be certain they will do so.
However, this can be done without full disclosure by each prospective
juror as to exactly what publicity has reached him or her. 79

VIII.

PRESUMPTIONS

In Yates v. Evatt, 80 the Court struck down as unconstitutional an
instruction allowing the jury to presume the necessary malice for murder
from either the use of a deadly weapon or from the committing of any

71. /d. at 330._
72. The effect of such statutes is to render inadmissible as a matter of policy any
evidence on the alleged victim's past -sexual conduct or reputation or opinion evidence of
the same. The purposes ate to prevent a criminal trial for rape or other sex crimes from
becoming a review of the victim's sexual history and, by removing such possibility, to
encourage victims to come forth and seek help through the criminal process.
73. 111 S. Ct. 1743 (1991).
74. !d. at 1748.
15. IND. CODE § 35-31-4-4 (1988).
76. Ill S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
77. 421 u.s. 794 (1975).
78. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908~
19. /d.
80. 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991).
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•

unlawful act. sa. (South Carolina had no felony murder statute.) The Court
noted that juries can be instructed on a permissive inference (as opposed
to a presumption), provided there is a sufficiently rational connection
between the basic facts and the facts to be presumed. 82

IX. CRVEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Harmelin v. Michigan 83 generated deep division and long exposition
on the ''proportionality'' aspect of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant, a first offender, was
sentenced to life with no possibility of parole for possession of 672
grams of cocaine under a statutory sentencing mandate. The Court upheld
the sentence as not "grossly disproportionate/' 84 Two Justices would
jettison the proportionality aspect entirely as being outside the history
and intent of the Eighth Amendment. Five held the_statute was not in
fact grossly disproportionate even though it mandated the sentence with
no case-specific findings.

X. PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
Burns v. R_eed, 85 a case from Delaware County, was not itself a
criminal case, but a section 1983 action against a prosecutor. However,
it has obvious and far~reaching consequences for those in criminal practice. A six Justice majority of the Court reinforced the total immunity
of public prosecutors set forth in Imbler v. Pachtman86· for actions arising
out of judicial proceedings. Thus, even though the plaintiff alleged that

•

the prosecutor had been party to misleading a judge during a probable
cause hearing, because such hearing is part and parcel of the judicial
proceeding, absolute immunity applied. However, the plaintiff also alleged
that the prosecutor gave improper advice to the police in advising that
they could hypnotize the plaintiff (who was a suspect). As to this charge,

the Court unanimously held that the prosecutor is to have only qualified
immunity because giving advice to police during the investigative stage
is not within the judicially connected part of the prosecutor's function. 87
The Court noted that it was anomalous to extend total immunity to a
prosecutor for giving legal advice to police and to give police only
qualified immunity for following it.88

81. /d. at 1888.
82. I d. at 1897.
83. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
84. ld. at 2704.
85. 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991).
86. 424 u.s. 409 (1976).
87. Borus, Ill S. Ct. at 1943.
88'. ld.
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PROCESS

In Schad v. Arizona, 89 a five to four Court decided an intriguing
set of questions arising in a first degree murder prosecution. The Arizona
murder statute, as is common, collected under the one heading, ''firstdegree murder," both premeditated killings and felony murder killings. 90
Although this grouping is not historically unusual, no one ever seriously
doubted that premeditated killing and felony murder were different
crimes. Their constituent elements are clearly different. 91 There was some
the killing was arguably premeditated
evidence supporting each crime
and was alleged to have occurred during a robbery. The instructions
did not require that the jury unanimously agree on a single theory. In
effect, the trial court instructed the jury that these were merely t\VO
different ways to get to the same crime
first degree murder. Nor
was the jury required to announce how it arrived at a verdict; it was
sufficient that all twelve agreed to first degree murder. Thus, even though
theoretically only six believed the killing was premeditated and only six
believed it was committed during a robbery, the jury could, and did,
convict. The Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional infirmity in the instruction since these were two theories which underlay
the same offense, first-degree murder.92 This decision is truly astounding.
It calls into question the protections afforded b,y the ''beyond a reasonable
doubt'' protection and the usubstantial majority decisionu requirement. 93
The defendant also complained that the jury was not given the option
of finding him guilty of robbery as a lesser included offense in contravention of the rule in Beck v. Alabama.!~4 Beck stands for the proposition that omitting the lesser included offense choice (assuming, of
course, it is supported by evidence) places the jury in an ali-or-nothing

89. 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
90. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (repealed 1978).
91. First degree premeditated murder requires proof of an intent to kill plus the
aspect of premeditation which implies an intent achieved after deliberation, thought, or
planning. It requires no proof that the, defendant was engaging in an independent felony.
Felony murder, on the other hand, requires no proof of intent to kill, but instead requires
proof that death was caused by the defendant while engaging or attempting to engage in
one of the felonies listed in the statute, such as burglary, rape, or robbery.
92. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2505. This decision has an obvious application in Indiana.
The Indiana murder statute, IND. CooE § 35-42-1-1 (Supp. 1991), groups under the one
heading and statute "intentional" or "knowing" killing on the one hand and felony
murder on the other.
93. Until 1972, criminal juries had to be unanimous to convict. In Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute which
permitted conviction (or acquittal) on fewer than 12 (in that case 10). Yet, the Court's
opinion in Apodaca made it clear that a bare majority is insufficient.
94. 447 U.S, 625 (1980).
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posture and exerts unfair pressure toward conviction. 95 The Schad Court
found that Beck was not controlling because the jury, though it was
not given a robbery option, was given a second degree murder option,
96
thereby taking this out of the ali-or-nothing rule. This second holding
is, of course, generated by the first and demonstrates the kind of problems
such a holding can produce. If one begins by understanding premeditated
first degree murder and felony murder as the same crime, then second
degree murder surely is a lesser included offense. However, second degree
murder is not lesser included in felony murder because felony murder
requires no proof of intent to kill and second degree murder does. Those
jurors (anywhere from zero to twelve) whose verdict was based on a
felony murder theory had no lesser crime to select other than as a purely
irrational compromise verdict. Those jurors were in precisely the posture
that the Beck rule was designed to avoid.

XII.

•

CoNFRONTATION

In Brady v. State, 97 criminal law practitioners were reminded of the
importance of basing their clients' claims on all available grounds,
including the Indiana Constitution. State procedures which meet the
minimal requirements of the federal constitution may not pass muster
when examined for compliance with the requirements of the Indiana
Constitution. The right of confrontation serves as a recent example.
In Brady, the State sought leave to videotape the testimony of a
child witness who was alleged to have been sexually abused. Videotaping
98
such testimony was authorized by statute. The statute permitted a court
to order the videotaping of a child's testimony for use at trial if, among
other requirements, the child was the victim, was less than ten years
old, and would be traumatized by testifying in the courtroom. Finding
all statutory requirements to be met, the trial court ordered the child's
testimony to be videotaped prior to trial. The testimony was taken in
the child's home with the child, judge, prosecutor, defense counsel,
child's mother, and video operator present. The defendant was located
in the garage of the home and was able to see and hear the child via
closed circuit television. The defendant could speak with his counsel by
microphone. The child could not see or hear the defendant and was
not aware of his presence.
The Indiana Supreme Court first focused on the Sixth Amendment
requirement that the accused shall enjoy the right ''to be confronted

95.

/d. at 645-46.

96. Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2505 (1991).
97. 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991)
98. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-8 (Supp. 1991).
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with the witnesses against him.-'' 99 On this issue, the court found Maryland
v~ Craig100 to be controlling_
. In Craig, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a similar Maryland procedure which permitted the child's live testimony to be transmitted to the courtroom via
one-way closed circuit television. 101 Craig made clear that the Confrontation Clause does not require an actual face-to-face encounter at trial
in every instance. 102 Rather, the Sixth Amendment confrontation right
is generally met if the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to
probe through cross-examination. 103 Although the Indiana statutory pro104
cedure was slightly different than that analyzed in Craig, the essential
requirements of confrontation as defined by Craig were present.. 105
The proc_edure did not fare so well when tested against the right of
the_accused ''to meet the witnesses face to face'' as guaranteed by the
Indiana Constitution. 106 The court recognized that the federal confrontation requirement and the Indiana provision have much the same meaning and share a similar history. 107 Both are designed primarily to protect
the right of cross-examination. 108 Nevertheless, unlike the Sixth Amend-;
ment confrontation right, the Indiana guarantee is not fulfilled by merely
ensuring that the right to cross-examine is scrupulously honored. 109 The
specific language guaranteeing "the right • . . to meet the witnesses face
to face'' recognizes that face-to-face encounters do influence recollection,
veracity, and communication. 110
Because the statutory procedure mandated that the child not b_e able
to see or hear the accused_, those particular provisions of the statute

99. U.S. CaNST;. amend. VI.
100. 110 S. Ct. 3157 {1990).
101. /d. at 3166.
102. ld. at 3164.
103. Id.
104. The Maryland procedure provided for the child's live testimony
to
be
taken
•
outside the courtroom and transmitted to the factfinder and defendant. The Indiana ·statute
authorized the same procedure or, as actually employed in the instant case, videotaping
the testimony prior to trial with the defendant separated from the child.
1OS. Craig holds that the presence of an oath, cross-examination, and the ability
to observe the witnesses' demeanor, albeit by close circuit camera, are sufficient to ensure
reliability and that adversarial probing occurs. With these attributes, the testimony is
deemed the functional equivalent of live, in-person testimony~ Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.
Ct. 3157, 3166 (1990).
106. IND. CaNST. art 1, § 13. Failure to apply the face-to-face requirement in
Circumstances such as these is nat fundamental error. Hart v. State, 518 N.E.2d 336 (Ind.
1991). Thus, failure to assert the claim at trial precludes the claim on appeal. ld. at 338.
107. Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 986, 987 (Ind. 1991).
108. Id. at 985, 988.
109. Id. at 988.
110. !d. (citing IND. CONST., art 1, § 13}.
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must fail as violative of the defendant's right to a face~to-face meeting
with the_witness. 111 Thus, the Indiana confrontation requirement provides
greater protection to the accused than does its federal counterpart embodied in the Sixth Amendment.
The court noted that a face-to-face meeting could be accomplished
by us_e of a twa-way closed circuit arrangement which would permit the
separated witness and the accused to see one another. 112 Such a procedure
would not only satisfy the face-to-face requirement, but would also
accomplish the essential purpose of the statute, affording protection to
the child witness.

XIII. TRIAL

EVIDENCE

The next significant case; Modesitt v. State, 113 also involved the
admissibility of a child's statements in a sex abuse case. Although not
of c_o nstitutional dimension, the ruling has far-reaching effects. In Modesitt, the accused was pummeled by testimony from the child's mother,
a welfare case worker, and a psychologist regarding statements the child
had made to each of them. The hearsay statements were admitted on
the authority of Patterson v. State. 114 The child testified after this
testimony was received.- She corroborated most of the acts previously
narrated via the hearsay, but not all. She was not asked specifically
whether she made the statements attributed to her by the other three
witnesses nor whether the stateme-nts were true.
The court first inquired whether the Patterson rule was abused. The
court noted that the rationale for the Patterson holding, which permitted
admission of prior statements as substantive evidence, was that the
truthfulness of the statement could be tested by cross-examination of
the declarant. 115 This rationale was the basis for the Patterson requirement
that the declarant be present and available for cross-examination. The
rule was not intended to permit the out-of-court statements to serve as
a substitute for direct testimony. 116 Such substitution O'Ccurred in Modesitt
because the three witnesses told the victim's story and continually repeated
her accusations before the victim testified.. As a result, the accused was
denied the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant in a timely fashion
.

.

111. /d. The offensive provisions: are subsections (c) and (f)(7) of IND_. CoDB § 3537-4-8 (Supp. 1991).
112. Brady v. State~ 515 N.E.2d 980, 989 {Ind. 1991).
113. 578 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. 1991).
114. 324 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 1975). Patterson permitted the admission of prior out
of court statements, not under oath, as substantive evidence if the declarant was present
and available for cross-examination at the time of admission.
115. Modesitt, 518 N.E.2d at 651.
116. /d.
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regarding the truthfulness of the statements. Moreover, the constant
repetition of the accusations resulted in the victim's credibility being
established before the victim said a word. The court concluded that the
Patterson rule had been abused and the defendant prejudiced by the
''drumbeat repetition of the victim's original story prior to calling the
victim to testify."u'
The court then overruled Patterson because the simple rule first
adopted in that case was no longer recognizable as applied. 118 Instead,
the court adopted the content of Rule 801(d)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 119 Prior statements may be admitted as substantive evidence
only if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement and the statement is: (a) inconsistent with the
declarant's testimony and was given under oath; (b) consistent with the
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, improper influence or motive; or (c) one of identification of a
person made after perceiving the person. 120
In another case involving the admissibility of prior statements, Thomas
v. State, 121 the issue was intertwined with the right of the accused to
present a defense. In Thomas, the defendant sought to introduce the
prior statements of one Nelson. Nelson allegedly bragged to others that
he committed the robbery for which Thomas was on trial. In addition,
other evidence existed which implicated Nelson. Specifically, early in the
police investigation a clerk from a store near the robbery scene had
selected Nelson's picture from a photo array and identified him as being
present near the scene at the time of the robbery.
Nelson was called as a witness but declined to testify and invoked
his right against self-incrimination. Thomas then offered Nelson's prior
statements that he committed the robbery. The trial court declined to
admit the statements attributed to Nelson on hearsay grounds. The court
of appeals affirmed finding that third party confessions and declarations
against penal interest are permeated with untrustworthiness. The Indiana
Supreme Court reversed and observed that an accused has a constitutional
right to put on a defense 122 citing Chambers v. Mississippi. 123 The court
did not sanction the blanket admissibility or inadmissibility of declarations
against penal interest. Rather, it concluded that declarations against penal
interest should be admitted if corroborating circumstances clearly indicate

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 652.
Jd.

Id. at 653.
/d. at 653-54.
580 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1991).
!d. at 226.
410 u.s. 284 (1973).
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the trustworthiness of the statement. 124 This approach is the same as
that identified in Chambers and the Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).
Applying this test to the facts of Thomas, the court concluded that
corroboration was provided by the initial identification of Nelson, the
number of people to whom he had bragged, and the detail of the
125
statements in which he admitted that he had perpetrated the robbery~
Accordingly, the court found that Thomas should have been allowed to
present Nelson's statements against his penal interest as exceptions to
the hearsay rule.
The last significant case to be surveyed pertaining to trial evidence
is Hopkins v. State. 126 Hopkins deals with the admissibility of forensic
DNA evidence. By statute, Indiana has already provided that the results
of forensic DNA analysis are admissible without antecedent expert testimony that such evidence provides a trustworthy and reliable method
of identifying characteristics in an individual's genetic material.J 27 The
statute was passed after the events giving rise to the Hopkins case. Thus,
some aspects of the Hopkins decision, specifically the question of whether
the theory and techniques of DNA analysis can produce reliable results
generally accepted in the scientific community, has been mooted by the
statute. The Hopkins court answered this inquiry in the affirmative. 128
Notwithstanding the statute, Hopkins is important for two reasons.
First, the court utilized the test of Frye v. United States, 129 to assess
130
the reliability of the novel scientific evidence. Although it utilized this
test, the majority stopped short of holding that the Frye test is the
required standard to be used in determining the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence in Indiana. As it stands now, some cases, such as
Hopkins, use the Frye test which requires general scientific acceptance
of the theory and technique employed. Others require only a finding
124. Thomas, 580 N.E.2d at 226.
125. Id. at 227.
126. 579 N.E.2d 1297 (Ind. 1991).
127. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-13 (Supp. 1991).
128. Hopkins, 519 N.E.2d at 1302.
129. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
130. The Frye test, as discussed with apparent approval by the majority in Hopkins,
has three elements: (1) "Is there a theory, which is generally accepted in the scientific
community, which supports the conclusion that DNA forensic testing can produce reliable
results?, (2) ''Are there techniques or experiments that currently exist that are capable
of producing reliable results in DNA identification and which are generally accepted in
the scientific community?" (3) "Did the testing laboratory perform the accepted scientific
techniques in analyzing the forensic samples in this particular case?" Hopkins, 519 N.E.2d
at 1302. This test is more stringent, as pointed out by Justice Dickson, than Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, which does not require general scientific acceptance of the theory or
techniques. Id. at 1306 (Dickson, J., concurring) (observing that the majority's discussion
of Frye should not be construed as an endorsement or rejection of the Frye test).
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that the subject matter of the .e xpert's opinion be. beyond the knowledge
of lay persons and that the expert's knowledge will aid the jury.'131
The second important aspect of Hopkins involves the issue of whether
claimed irregularities in the DNA testing procedure actually employed
go to the admissibility of the evidence or merely to its weight~ In Hopkins,
the defendant asserted that irregularities had occurred. The court responded by indicating that once the trial court rules a witness qualified
to give expert testimony as a matter of law, subsequent evaluation of
the evidence goes only to its weight as a matter of fact. 132 Thereafter,
on a chain of custody claim, the court indicated that ''the proponent
is not required to exclude all possibility of tampering, but need only
provide a reasonable assurance that the evidence remained in undisturbed
condition.'' 133 Does this mean that proof of some irregularities such as
the mishandling of the specimen may go to admissibility?
Whether test procedure errors or omissions might affect more than
the weight to be given the evidence and actually determine admissibility
was addressed again in Davidson v. Indiana. 134 In Davidson, the admissibility of DNA evidence was again challenged on the ground that
irregularities had occurred in the test procedures. Again, the court indicated that irregularities in the test procedures go to the weight of the
evidence, 135 but then added, "[W]hile it might be that substantiated
irregularities would be a basis for prohibiting admission of test results,
the list of irregularities [defendant] Davidson perceives do not cause us
to believe the evidence was erroneously admitted. u 136 Thus, the fact
finder is still out on the question of whether some test irregularities
might affect admissibility and if so, the nature of those irregularities,
the burden allocation, and the quantum of proof necessary to establish
the same.
XIV.

In Slocumb v. State,

SENTENCING

the court dealt with a new question of law
concerning habitual offender sentencing and Indiana Code 35-50-2-S(h),
which provides: ''A person may not b,e sentenced as an habitual offender
under this section if all the felonies relied upon for sentencing the person
137

138 Slocumb argued that
as an habitual offender are class D felonies."
•

131. See id. at 1305-06 (Dickson J ., concurring).
132. /d.
133. Id. at 1304,
134. 580 N.E.2d ,238 (Ind., 1991).
135. /d. at 243.
136. Id.
137. 573 N.E.2d 427 (Ind. 1991).
138. IND. CoDE § 35-50-2-S(h) (Supp. 1991).

•
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this statute precluded a thirty year enhancement of sentence if the prior
convictions are from other states and the penalty imposed for each
conviction was within the sentencing range for Indiana class D felonies.
It is interesting to note that the court went out of its way to address
this issue. Regardless of the resolution to this question, Slocumb's sentence had to be vacated because the State failed to prove that the prior
convictions were felonies. Thus, the evidence was insufficient to establish
that he was a habitual offender . 139 Notwithstanding the presence of this
outcome determinative issue, the court addressed the effect of section
35-50-2-S(h) on Slocumb's case.
The court's discussion of the statute seems to go beyond the foreign
versus domestic felony grading issue and indicates that when all prior
felonies are at the class D level, the accused is not eligible for a thirty
year enhancement regardless of the nature of the present offense. 140 Some
vagueness remains for two reasons. First, Slocumb's current offense was
a class D felony; thus, the court may not have believed it necessary to
state that the statutory prohibition only applied if the current offense,
as well as the prior convictions, were class D felonies. Second, such a
construction would leave an apparent gap in the law. Note that the
statute dealing with class D habitual offenders seems to require that the
current offense, as well as all prior convictions, be class D felonies. 141
Thus, the offender with a class C felony charge, as the current
offense, and a history of D felony convictions, cannot be determined
to be a class D habitual offender. Now assume that Slocumb precludes
a thirty year enhancement when all the prior offenses are class D felonies,
regardless of the nature of the current charge. The result is that the
defendant currently charged with a class A, B, or C felony who has a
history of class D felony offenses is not eligible for any enhancement.
Regardless of the court's intent, Slocumb gives rise to such an argument.
142
In another sentencing case, Hensley v. State, the court of appeals
held that statements made during a "clean-up statement" which the
accused provided as part of a failed plea agreement were not admissible
143
at sentencing.
The court emphasized that the rule prohibiting the
admission of such statements in evidence is a substantive rule and not

139. Slocumb, 513 N.E.2d at 429.
140. Id. at428 ("[T]he apparent purpose of these amendments was to render ineligible
for 30-year enhancements those persons whose prior offenses were the least serious felonies.")
141. IND. ConE § 35-50-2-7.1 (Supp. 1991). See id. § 35-50-2-7.1(c) (providing that
the eight year enhancement shall be added to the sentence imposed under Section 7 of
the chapter). Section 7 deals with class D felony sentencing.
·
142. 573 N.E.2d 913 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
143. Id. at 918.
•

1992]

CRIMINAL LAW

1177

merely an evidentiary rule.- Thus, admission of such statements is barred
at sentencing as well as trial. 144
As a final note regarding sentencing, the legislature extended the
period for modification of sentence without the approval of the prosecuting attorney from 180 days to 365 days. 145 This modification probably
is entitled to retroactive effect on the theory that an extension of time
to do that which is perntitted already is procedural and therefore, outside
the general rule that the law in effect at the time_ the offense was
committed controls sentencing. 146
XV.

PosT CoNVICTION

The road to federal habeas review becomes more difficult with each
successive term_of the United States Supreme Court. This year was no
exception. The Court reviewed several cases involving those dreaded
omissions known as procedural defaults.
141
In Coleman v. Thompson counsel filed a notice of appeal to secure
review of the- denial of state habeas corpus relief three days late_. The
State moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The parties filed briefs
on the subject of the dismissal motion and on the merits. The state
appellate court issued a summary o-rder granting dismissal. The order
did not discuss the grounds for dismissal except to state, after identifying
all the papers filed, ''Upon consideration whereof, the motion to dismiss
is granted.'' 148
At the Supreme Court,: Coleman argued that the plain statement
rule of Harris v. Reed149 controlled. The Harris Court held that when
a defendant fails to raise a claim in accordance with state procedures
but did present the claim to a state court, the state court ruling rejecting
the claim will not be viewed as resting on the procedural default unless
the state court clearly indicates that it relied on that ground. tso Harris
unequivocally provided that a procedural default will not bar federal
review unless the last state court rendering judgment clearly and expressly
states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.'151
In response, the Court found that ''[a] predicate to the application
of the Harris presumption is that the decision of the last state court to
which petitioner presented his federal claims must fairly appear to rest

144. Id.
ConE § 35-38-1.:17 (Supp. l991).
Willis v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
Ill S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
/d. at 2553.
489 u.s. 255 (1989}.
ISO. /d. at 263.
151. ld..

l4S.
146.
147.
148.
149.

IND.
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primarily on federal law ot to be interwoven with federal law." 152 On
examination, the factual predicate .did not appear to exist in Coleman.
That is, it did not appear that the dismissal order rested on, or was
interwoven with, federal law. 153 As a consequence, Coleman was not
entitled to the Harris presumption. Coleman simply had defaulted under
state law.
Coleman sought to excuse the procedural default by arguing that
the omission occurred because of attorney error. The Court found that
because Coleman had no right to counsel to pursue his state habeas
corpus appeal, any attorney error regarding that appeal cannot constitute
cause to excuse the procedural default. 154 Counsel's ineffectiveness will
constitute cause only if it is an independent constitutional violation. 155
Absent a constitutional right to counsel, there can be no independent
constitutional violation because of counsel's ineffectiveness.
The Harris plain statement rule was limited further in Ylst v. Nunnemaker.156 In Ylst, the Court faced a scenario in which the last state
court denied relief summarily without stating that a state procedural bar
was the basis for the judgment. However, an intermediate appellate court
explicitly found a state procedural bar. 157 In Ylst, the plain statement
rule was modified again by the following presumption: ''[W]here there
has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later
unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim
rest upon the same ground.'' 158 Thus, if the earlier decision addressed
the merits of federal claims and denied reli~f, a later unexplained denial
will be presumed to rest on federal law. On the other hand, if the
earlier opinion finds that the defendant is not entitled to review on the
merits because of a state procedural bar, a subsequent unexplained denial
will be presumed to rest on the same grounds, i.e., the procedural
default. The presumption is rebuttable by strong evidence. 159
In another significant decision, McCleskey v. Zant, 160 the Court
adopted a new rule redefining the doctrine known as "abuse of the
writ.'' At McCleskey's state court murder trial, another jail inmate,
Evans, testified that McCleskey boasted about the killing. After his direct
appeal, McCleskey sought state habeas corpus relief on the ground that

152. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2559 (1991).
153. /d.
154. /d. at 2568.
155. Id. at 2567.
156. Ill S. Ct. 2590 (1991).
157. /d. at 2592.
158. /d. at 2594.
159. /d. at 2595.
160. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
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the statements to Evans were elicited in a situation created by the State
to induce him to make statements without the assistance of counsel in
violation of Massiah v. United States. 161 The state habeas court denied
relief and the Georgia Supreme Court denied discretionary review.
Thereafter, McCleskey sought federal habeas corpus relief but did
not raise the Massiah issue. Ultimately, that petition was denied. One
month before filing his second petition, McCleskey finally received a
twenty-one page statement that Evans had made to police two weeks
162
before McCleskey's original trial began. In addition, McCleskey located
the jailer in whose office the statement from Evans was taken. At the
hearing on the second federal petition, the jailer testified that he had
been asked to move Evans close to McCleskey.
In the end, McCleskey's claim was of no avait The Supreme Court
found that he had ~'abused the writ"' by failing to assert the Massiah_
163
claim in his first federal petition. The claim was available at that time
as was demonstrated by its inclusion in his earlier state habeas corpus
petition. The Court found that the abuse of the writ do-c trine was not
limited to cases involving deliberate abandonment. 164 Anticipating criticism that such a limitation was imposed by Sanders v. United States; 165
the Court asserted that Sanders discussed deliberate abandonment as one
example of conduct that results in forfeiture. 166
Under the McCleskey rule, a petitioner can abuse the writ by raising
a claim in a second petition that he could have raised in his first petition,
regardless of whether the omission was deliberate. 167 To excuse such an
omission, the petitioner must show cause and prejudice, as we now
understand those terms, or show that a fundamental miscarriage of
justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim. 168 A fundamental
miscarriage of justice occurs when an innocent man suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty. 169
XVI.

DEATH PENALTY

Perhaps the most significant Indiana development in the area of
death penalty law and practice was the amendment of Criminal Rule

161.
162.
v. United
163.
164.
165,
166.
167.
168.
169.

377 U-.S. 201 (1964).
McCleskey's claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio
States, 405' U.S. (1972} had already been denied.
McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1471, 1473.
/d. at 1467.
373 u.s. 1 (1963).
McCleskey, Ill S. Ct. at 1467.
/d. at 1468.
/d. at 1470.
/d. at 1471 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492-93 (1976)).
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24 to provide standards for the appointment of counsel and for
compensation of counsel. 170 Under the new rule, upon a finding of
indigency, the court shall appoint two qualified attorneys for trial.
To qualify as lead counsel, one must have at least five years of
criminal litigation experience with no fewer than five completed felony
jury trials and at least one capital case. Co-counsel must have at least
three years experience with at least three felony jury trials tried to
completion. Both counsel must have completed at least twelve hours
Qf training in the defense of capital cases within two years of the
appointment. 171 The rule also provides that trial counsel shall be appointed to serve as appellate counsel, if qualified. 172 Appellate counsel
must have three years experience in criminal litigation and have appellate experience in at least three felony appeals within the five year
period prior to appointment. The training requirements applicable to
trial counsel must also be met by appellate counsel. 173
When appointing trial or appellate counsel, the court is required
to assess the nature and volume of counsel's workload to assure_that
sufficient attention can be directed to the defense of the capital case. 174
Specific workload limitations are imposed on salaried or contractual
public defenders appointed as trial counsel in capital cases. Such a
defender may be appointed only if his or. her workload will not exceed
twenty open felony cases while the capital case is pending; no new
cases may be assigned to such counsel within thirty days of the trial
setting in the capital case. 175 Similarly, if appellate counsel is under
contract to provide other defense services, no new cases for appeal
shall be as-signed to that counsel until the brief is filed in the capital
case. 116
Compensation for counsel is set at an hourly rate of seventy dollars
177
per hour for all necessary and reasonable services, with adjustments
to the compensation paid contract employees for other defense services
to reflect the limitations on case assignments. 178 The rule also provides
that trial counsel s,h all be provided with sufficient funds for investigative, expert, and other services necessary to present a defense at
179
every stage of the proceeding, including sentencing.
170. IND.
171. IND.
172. IND.
173. ld.
174. IND.

CRIM. R. 24.

CRJM. R. 24(B)(l), (2).
CRIM. R. 24(J).

CRIM. R. 24(B)(3), (J)(2).
175. IND. CRIM. R. 24(B)(3).
176. IND. CRIM. R. 24(J){2).
177.. IND. CRIM. R. 24(C)(l); (K){l).
178. IND. CRIM. R. 24{C)(3), (K)(2).
179. IND. CRIM. R. 24(C){2).
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In case law developments, the United States Supreme Court overruled Booth v. Maryland, 180 and South Carolina v. Gathers, 181 the
victim impact cases. This reversal of recent precedent came in Payne
v. Tennessee, 182 in which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
does not bar the admission of victim impact evidence or prosecutorial
183
argument on the subject. In Payne, the Court con~luded that the
reasoning of Booth and Gathers was flawed. Both were described as
being premised on the notion that victim impact evidence does not
reflect on the defendant's blameworthiness and that only evidence
relating to blameworthiness is relevant in a capital sentencing. 184 The
Court concluded that evidence of the harm inflicted, i.e., the impact
on the victim, has been and is an important factor in determining the
appropriate punishment to be imposed in criminal cases. 185 In the
Court's view, a state could conclude that evidence of the specific harm
caused by the accused is relevant to the defendant's moral culpability
and blameworthiness. 186 This being the case, there is no reason to
treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence; at least,
the Eighth Amendment erects no such bar. 187 If victim impact evidence
is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair,
the Due Process Clause provides the vehicle for relief. 188

XVII.

CONCLUSION

Federal and Indiana courts continue to hear a high volume of criminal
cases. The overall direction of the trend, manifested both in court
decisions and legislative enactments, continues to be toward providing
greater scope to criminal law enforcement and a narrowing of constitutional due process interests. However, as the Supreme Court of the
United States narrows constitutional rights, the Indiana Supreme Court
clearly maintains the momentum established over the past several years
to expanding protections under the state constitution. That document
seems slowly to be rising from its torpor.

180. 482 u.s. 496 (1987).
181. 490 u.s. 805 (1989).
182. Ill S. Ct. 2597 (1991).

183. Id. at 2609.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 2605.
ld. at 2608.
Id.
/d. at 2609.
Id. at 2608.
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